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Abstract:  This paper examines legal and regulatory measures that can be taken to 
promote access to the primary market in emerging market economies.   While capital 
market development depends on many factors including, primarily, a favorable 
macroeconomic environment, an appropriately designed and effective legal and 
regulatory framework can help to encourage market growth and to increase access to 
finance for all companies, including small-and-medium size enterprises.  In this paper we 
identify the basic necessities that underpin a regulatory regime that is cost effective and 
strikes an appropriate balance between, on the one hand, laws and regulations that may 
be too restrictive to achieve a supply of capital and, on the other, those that may be so 
relaxed that investors feel that there is an unacceptable level of risk and do not care to 
venture into the market.  We explore the legal foundations for the successful operation of 
a primary market for securities and identify disclosure and effective monitoring and 
enforcement as essential elements of legal protection.  We then examine different legal 
and regulatory approaches for improving access to finance.  We discuss measures that 
can be used by traditional stock exchanges to attract smaller enterprises to their lists as 
well as recent initiatives to create second boards or divide the main board into different 
market segments.  We also discuss different mechanisms for companies to raise funds 
outside of a formal stock market listing, including private placements and private equity.  
Finally, we propose some recommendations for a simple legal and regulatory framework 
that will help promote access to primary equity markets, via both the traditional exchange 
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I.  Introduction  
 
Strong capital markets are an engine of economic growth.  By creating 
liquidity and generating information, markets encourage people to save and invest, 
and by increasing savings and investment and allocating risk, they contribute to 
economic development.
1  Equity markets can be an effective source of financing for 
big and small companies alike. Going public may increase a company’s status and 
have a positive impact on its relationships with customers and other outsiders.
2  In 
this paper, we look at the question of how to create strong equity markets that can 
serve as a viable source of financing for domestic companies.  We take a legal and 
regulatory approach to try to answer this question.   
 
Capital market development is a function of a number of different conditions.  
Primary among these is a favorable macroeconomic environment, but, in addition, 
there needs to be supportive technical infrastructure, enforceable property rights and a 
policy that encourages private sector growth, an adequate bankruptcy system that 
supports creditor rights, well-developed legal and accounting and professions along 
with accounting and audit standards, and an efficient judicial system accompanied by 
credible enforcement.  Fulfilling all of these conditions is difficult and takes a long 
time.  Nonetheless, progress can be made and is being made.  In this paper, we focus 
in particular on the legal and regulatory conditions necessary for capital market 
development.  Economic growth is facilitated when the market operates under laws, 
regulation and supervision that cater to its current and future stages of development.  
Issuers and investors have more confidence in raising and investing funds in the 
equity market when the legal, regulatory and supervisory framework promotes new 
issues and, at the same time, provides adequate mechanisms for protecting investors. 
 
Our objective in this paper is to identify the basic necessities that underpin a 
regulatory regime that is cost effective and strikes an appropriate balance between, on 
the one hand, laws and regulations that may be too restrictive to achieve a supply of 
capital and, on the other, those that may be so relaxed that investors feel that there is 
an unacceptable level of risk and do not care to venture into the market.  In 
attempting to realize this objective we have considered the Objectives and Principles 
of Securities Regulation adopted by the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) and the IOSCO Methodology for assessing their 
implementation.  These high regulatory standards are intended to maintain fair, 
efficient and transparent markets, protect investors and reduce systemic risk.   
 
Without doubting the importance and universality of the IOSCO Objectives 
and Principles, we believe that they do not provide a realistic roadmap to capital 
market development for emerging market economies.  Therefore, we are putting 
forward a list of basic necessities for improving the laws and regulations of many 
emerging markets. We believe that, for these markets, putting into effect the basic 
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necessities will be a useful step along the way to full implementation of the 
Principles. 
 
In this paper, we look first at the desirability of promoting access to primary 
equity markets in small emerging economies.  Typically, companies in such markets 
rely primarily on short-term bank financing, or relatively small capital infusions from 
family, friends and trading partners.  However, while this type of financing is self-
limiting and does not promote the broader capital market development necessary to 
support economic growth, there are many obstacles to creating strong equity markets 
that can serve as a source of capital for such companies.   
 
We explore the legal foundations for the successful operation of a primary 
market for securities and identify disclosure and effective monitoring and 
enforcement as essential elements of legal protection.  Then we examine the 
incentives and impediments that companies face in listing their securities on domestic 
stock exchanges.  We also look at recent initiatives that stock exchanges have taken 
in an endeavor to attract smaller enterprises to their lists by creating second boards or 
dividing the main board into different market segments. Stock exchanges, however, 
are not the only option for equity offers, and in many cases may not be the best 
available alternative.  We therefore discuss different mechanisms for companies to 
raise funds outside of a formal stock market listing.  Finally, we propose some 
recommendations for a simple legal and regulatory framework that will help promote 
access to primary equity markets, both the traditional exchange as well as other 
alternatives.   
 
II.  The Need to Promote Access to Primary Markets 
 
Much research has been conducted that shows that countries with better 
developed capital markets, markets that are deep and liquid and that operate smoothly 
and efficiently, also have stronger overall economies and more rapid economic 
growth.   Equity markets, both formal and informal, are essentially meeting places for 
investors and sellers.  Equity markets mobilize savings, allocate capital and risk, and 
exert external discipline on issuers.  Without equity markets, smaller or riskier 
businesses may have difficulty finding financing.  Without equity markets, banks 
themselves may have difficulty growing, and providing loans to more people.  
Without equity markets, investors are likely to be less willing to purchase and hold 
corporate bonds.
3  Indeed, “the importance of financial markets in general, and stock 
markets in particular, for the efficient functioning of an economy cannot be 
exaggerated.”
4  And, as has been well-recognized since the Asian financial crisis of 
                                                 
3 While we focus in this paper on equity markets, corporate debt also can play an important role in 
expanding capital market development.   Typically, the legal and regulatory framework for corporate debt 
and equity are quite similar.  Therefore, much of what we say in this paper about the need to create a 
fundamental legal and regulatory framework applies equally to the development of a corporate debt market.    
4 Claessens and Revilla, 2005.   See, also, F. Lopez-de-Silanes 2005, “A large literature links financial 
development to economic growth.  King and Levine initiate the modern incarnation of this literature by 
showing that countries with better developed capital markets grow faster in the future.”   4




Of course this begs the questions of what constitutes a capital market and how 
a successful one can be created.  Formal organized stock exchanges have been 
established in many countries in recent years. However, many of these exchanges 
could not be characterized as successful, either in terms of performance indicators 
(i.e., liquidity, turnover, new issues, market capitalization, etc.), or in terms of their 
contribution to domestic economic growth.  In many small emerging markets, stock 
exchanges simply have failed to thrive.  They have only a few listings, new public 
offerings are rare, and there is hardly any trading.  While trading frequently also 
occurs outside of the formal stock exchange on informal over-the-counter markets, 
these too have failed to generate equity market development on a significant scale. 
  
Globalization and technology, in many ways forces for modernization and 
development, have contributed to this bleak picture.  Where they are able, larger 
issuers from more advanced emerging markets sometimes escape their domestic 
constraints and dual list on global markets, particularly the New York Stock 
Exchange and the London Stock Exchange.  For example, “by March 1995, over 
87%, 54%, 62% and 71% of the Mexican, Argentine, Chilean and Brazilian local 
market indices, respectively, were available for trading in the United States in the 
form of ADRs.”
6  A recent World Bank study of capital markets in Latin America 
found, disturbingly, that domestic market reforms resulted in a larger proportion of 
issuers going abroad, and led to less liquidity and weaker markets at home.
7   
 
If emerging markets are unable to serve as a major source of capital for their 
leading issuers, perhaps, in the face of globalization, their strategic focus should be 
instead on serving the smaller, less well-known domestic issuer.
8  Indeed, small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) form the economic backbone of most emerging 
market economies.  Instead of focusing on prime issuers who, it appears, may leave 
                                                 
5 A. Greenspan 2000. “The failure to have alternative forms of intermediation was of little consequence so 
long as the primary means worked. That is, the lack of a spare tire is of no concern if you do not get a flat. 
East Asia had no spare tires.”   
6 K. Hargis, 2000.  “International Cross-Listing and Stock Market Development in Emerging Economies,” 
International Review of Economics and Finance 9,  p. 103.  In Brazil alone, there has been extensive 
migration abroad (mainly to the U.S.) since the mid 1990s, particularly of the larger and more prestigious 
companies. 
7A. de la Torre, and S. Schmukler, 2004.    Of course, even if dual listings detract in theory from the 
potential liquidity of the domestic market, they can in practice help make a domestic market more liquid 
than it would be absent the dual listing.  By piggybacking on the higher volumes of a large international 
market, dually listed shares may be able to be traded more efficiently on the domestic market than they 
would be otherwise.  See, e.g.,  K. Hargis, 2000, who argues that the expansion of cross-listings in Latin 
America paralleled and contributed to increasing market capitalization.  “[I]nternational cross-listings have 
been instrumental in the development of stock markets in Latin America since 1989, increasing stock prices 
and issuance of equity and enhancing liquidity.” Id., at p. 103.   
8 Another possible response to the decline in domestic markets is for issuers to turn instead to regional 
markets.  The development and advantages and disadvantages of regional markets is beyond the scope of 
this paper.  Nonetheless, the authors do not believe that regional markets will contribute much to domestic 
economic growth, at least not for many years.   5
home as soon as they are able, emerging markets could concentrate on improving 
access to finance for SMEs, and increasing market participation by domestic retail 
and institutional investors.  However, while many emerging markets support a stock 
exchange, in most cases this has not seemed to be an effective source of financing for 
domestic SMEs.   
 
Technological advances, which one would expect to benefit emerging markets 
and SMEs by lowering the cost of access, have not achieved their anticipated 
potential.  Stock exchanges have not generated listings or finance for SMEs, and 
government authorities have not found ways to encourage SMEs to turn to public 
markets for financing.  However, for many emerging markets, the growth and 
financing of SMEs is vital to their economic health.  “In recent workshops across 
Africa, one hears repeatedly that the future economic growth of developing African 
countries is dependent upon the success of the small and medium-sized enterprises.  
From rural areas to the cities, the growth of small businesses will generate increased 
employment, wages, goods and services, and tax revenues.  It is therefore in the 
direction of SMEs that developing countries should turn their attention.”
9   
 
This is true in Asia as well.  “Small and medium-sized enterprises have 
traditionally played an important role in economic development in Asia by creating a 
large share of new jobs, especially outside urban centres where the incidence of 
poverty is greatest.  Thus, promoting SMEs can contribute to poverty alleviation and 
help to improve the distribution of income in a country.”
10  The situation is the same 
in Latin America. 
 
Thus, despite globalization and technology, and perhaps in part because of 
globalization and technology, most equity markets have failed to generate significant 
capital development and growth.  The challenges to equity market development are 
manifold and varied.     
 
III.  Common Challenges to Equity Market Development  
 
Many stock exchanges around the world have not achieved the results that had 
been anticipated when they were established.  Privatizations, even where they have 
been conducted over the domestic exchange, have certainly not served as a steady 
source of public offerings and growth.  In some transition economies, the stock 
exchange experienced an initial spurt of growth as a result of the privatization process 
only to see the number of listed companies drop in subsequent years and growth 
stagnate and even decline.  In other countries, privatizations either did not occur in 
any significant number, or took place outside of the exchange altogether.   
                                                 
9 S. Cohn, 2004 
10 Seok-Dong Wang, 2003/2004.  The Development of E-Financing Implications for SMEs, Bulletin on 
Asia-Pacific Perspectives.  Note though that Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Thorsten Beck find that “while a 
thriving SME sector is a characteristic of flourishing economies, the results do not support the contention 
that SMEs accelerate growth and reduce poverty, calling into question the policy of directly subsidizing 
their development.”    6
 
Even in countries with a thriving small business culture, the companies, which 
are largely family-owned, continue to be reluctant to list on the exchange and new 
listings are few and far between.  In addition, in many countries prime companies are 
listed on foreign markets, and local exchanges remain less attractive for foreign 
investors.  These factors have produced domestic securities markets in vastly different 
emerging markets which look surprisingly similar, despite large differences in market 
capitalization. While the characteristics identified below may not be present in all 
markets, as a general matter, they are typical of many emerging equity markets and 
frequently represent both the cause and effect of one another.    
 
Many emerging markets operate with low levels of transparency, poor 
information disclosure and weak corporate governance.  In contrast, robust disclosure 
rules, monitoring and enforcement, and information dissemination are positively 
associated with a vibrant equity market.
11  Timely and credible company disclosure 
promotes investor confidence, thus encouraging investors to participate more actively 
in the market.  Greater liquidity may attract additional listings, which in turn increase 
investors’ access to trading opportunities.  As a result, market activity may increase, 
and capital formation is facilitated.  However, since outside investors are not the 
primary source of finance in emerging markets, the external demand for disclosure 
and market liquidity is lower than in developed economies, and there is not much 
pressure either on issuers or governments to provide better disclosure or to improve 
governance.
12  Moreover, in countries with poor investor protection and low 
economic development, where outside finance is expensive and better governance 
mechanisms may be unavailable or very costly, there is little incentive for companies 
to adopt better governance because it does not result in a lower cost of capital.
13  
 
In addition to low levels of disclosure, transparency and weak corporate 
governance, stock exchanges in many emerging markets tend to be characterized by a 
substantial lack of liquidity.  While liquidity can be measured in different ways, as a 
general matter, a liquid market is one in which there is a reasonable amount of 
turnover or trading, and where large transactions can take place quickly and 
efficiently.  Emerging stock markets typically have very low turnover, with only a 
few companies responsible for a large percentage of the total trading that takes place.  
In Chile, for example, the annual turnover ratio of listed companies is lower than ten 
percent annually.  In Brazil, ten companies account for more than 50% turnover and 
100 companies account for 99% of total trading.  In Mexico, almost all of the trading 
is conducted in the shares of a few dozen large international companies.
14   
 
Accompanying the low levels of liquidity are low percentages of free float 
(the percentage of shares available for sale to the public).  Thus, even those 
companies that decide to go public only offer a small percentage of their shares for 
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sale.  For example, in Brazil, the free float is only approximately 20 percent, even 
though there are over 400 listed companies.  In Columbia, the free float is about 10 or 
15 percent, and in Chile, it is approximately 36 percent.  The low level of free float 
contributes to the limited liquidity.     
 
Ironically, the very absence of a healthy capital market – the poor disclosure 
and transparency, and low levels of liquidity and free float -- can itself discourage 
issuers and investors and thus contributes to a self-perpetuating cycle which presents 
a challenge for development.  Weak, shallow markets without much liquidity are not 
attractive either to issuers or investors.  Issuers will not find such markets to be an 
efficient source of capital and are likely to continue to find bank financing to be less 
expensive than the market, particularly when the issuer may have a long standing 
relationship with a particular bank.  Investors, especially foreign investors, will not 
find many investment opportunities in such markets, and may well be worried about 
the risks they are assuming in investing in a market with little transparency or depth.  
Indeed, “the size, depth and liquidity of securities markets has clearly been found to 
correlate directly with the quality of the legal protections given shareholders.”
15  
Weak secondary market mechanisms are thus a key constraint on primary market 
activity.   
 
Along with small and weak markets comes a limited investor base.  Emerging 
markets, which typically have low levels of savings, generally do not have a large 
middle class that can constitute a widely diversified investor base providing 
significant participation from both retail and wholesale investors.  In recent years, 
however, the institutional investor base has grown considerably, particularly in Latin 
America.  However, these investors may find only limited opportunities in the 
domestic market.  Countries frequently impose stringent restrictions on the range of 
products in which institutional investors may invest, requiring them either to invest 
only in domestic listed issuers or issuers with an investment grade credit rating, for 
example.  In addition, institutional investors generally will only invest in issuers of a 
certain size in order to obtain the benefits of diversification and to keep the costs of 
portfolio monitoring under control.  Thus, even in those countries where an 
institutional investor base has recently developed, there is not a ready pool of capital 
sufficient to attract small companies.  Institutional investors thus have not contributed 
to the development of the market to the extent one might expect.
16 
 
Emerging economies are grappling with very basic issues as they endeavor to 
improve the quality and timeliness of information and increase the level of liquidity 
in their nascent securities markets.  Investors in these markets may not be familiar 
with the risks and benefits of investing in securities or with the importance of 
demanding adequate and timely disclosure.  The absence in many countries of an 
active investor base consisting of pension funds, insurance companies and collective 
investment schemes, as well as retail investors experienced in equity investment, is a 
challenge for emerging market authorities seeking to raise awareness among potential 
                                                 
15 Coffee 1999 
16 See, Latin American Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 2005   8
issuers of the role of the securities market in the economy and the viable alternative it 
can provide for funding business expansion.
17  
 
In addition, in emerging market economies, the securities regulator is typically 
poorly resourced and has only limited authority, especially as compared to the central 
bank or even an independent bank supervisor.  The limited powers and resources of 
the securities regulator lead to significant shortcomings in its ability to oversee the 
markets, supervise market participants, and enforce issuer compliance.  The securities 
market thus may not have the reputation for fairness and integrity that comes with 
strong oversight and enforcement.  While this phenomenon is not limited to emerging 
markets, the disparity of the resources and the authority between the central bank and 
the securities regulator may be even greater in an emerging market than in a 
developed market. 
 
  While these characteristics present significant challenges to capital market 
development and economic growth, they are not insurmountable impediments.  
Although legal and regulatory measures cannot overcome all of these difficulties, and 
many other factors, including, primarily, the macro-economic environment, are 
critical, an appropriately designed and effective legal and regulatory framework 
can help to encourage market growth and to increase access to finance for all 
companies, including small and medium sized enterprises.  We discuss below such a 
‘basic’ legal and regulatory framework. 
 
IV.       Basic Legal and Regulatory Framework 
 
A.  Necessary vs. Nice  
 
Law and regulation establish the basis for the successful operation of a 
primary market for securities so that companies may have confidence in raising funds 
through the market when macroeconomic conditions are conducive for public 
offerings of quality securities. The market will only grow if basic legal protections are 
available to provide both domestic and foreign investors with confidence to invest. 
Investors need to be assured – or at least have a minimal level of confidence -- that 
their funds will not be lost as a result of fraudulent practices or unchecked insider 
dealing, and that they will be able to participate fairly in benefits that may arise from 
the success of the business or a possible change in control. 
 
Taking into account the typical characteristics of many emerging markets, the 
obstacles to development that they face, and the difficulty of competing with global 
markets, policy makers should focus on the development of a primary market that can 
provide capital to small and medium sized domestic companies, and the related 
reasonable legal and regulatory framework.  Legal and regulatory reform should not 
seek to replicate the regulatory environment in more developed markets but, instead, 
should concentrate on what is “necessary” rather than what would be “nice.”  Most 
important is ensuring legal certainty, and providing clearly expressed and readily 
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understandable regulation that is accessible and easy to comply with and to enforce, 
especially given resource and other constraints.  In considering what laws and 
regulations should be introduced to stimulate access to primary markets, there is a 
need to have regard to the stage of development of the securities market in the 
country in order to ensure that the laws will be a good fit in the existing legal 
framework and cultural environment.   
 
It is not essential to introduce rules that reflect international best practice in 
one step if the rules are not relevant for the efficient conduct of the market or if the 
market is not sufficiently mature to absorb them.  It is important for the country to 
develop a program of reform that will facilitate development by striking a balance 
between changes that are necessary in order to move towards best practice and not 
making too many changes that exhaust the market’s appetite for reform and impede 
development.  It is desirable to promote a program that will permit relevant actors in 
public and private sectors to move in the same direction at the same time over a 
reasonable timeframe that adapts to the current circumstances.  It is a matter of 
balancing the desire to foster entrepreneurial activity against the need to adequately 
protect investors in the primary market.  It may also be relevant to consider regional 
differences where laws are to be harmonized to promote regional initiatives and 
ensure that new rules will dovetail readily with the rules of nearby markets where 
linkages or alliances are likely to be forged in the future. 
 
B.  Minimum rules and standards required to support the market 
 
While capital markets still form a small and relatively insignificant portion of 
the economy in many emerging markets, this is not a reason to avoid funding reform 
efforts.  “Developing-country equity markets are small and often insignificant 
precisely because they are poorly regulated.”
18  Without basic information disclosure 
and confidence in their ability to enforce their rights, investors will be unwilling to 
risk investments in stock market, or will discount the price of the companies whose 
securities they purchase, stronger companies will refrain from listing or go elsewhere, 
and the market will remain small.   
 
A basic legal and regulatory structure is necessary to provide investors with 
the confidence to trade at arms length in a market where they lack information and 
risk expropriation by majority owners, and to permit firms to take on anonymous 
dealings and obtain outside funding from banks or investors.
19  Disclosure and 
transparency help enhance the honesty and integrity of the securities market, thereby 
promoting the confidence of both investors and issuers.  For this reason, disclosure is 
critical, and is the basis on which developed securities markets are regulated.  “By 
focusing on market integrity and full disclosure, the regulatory system can foster 
growth and development without running the risk of becoming out-dated and 
unresponsive.”
20  The oft-cited research by La Porta et. al., concluding that “what 
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works in securities laws” is mandatory disclosure requirements and a simple 
procedure for private enforcement by investors, supports this focus.
21   Thus, even 
without targeting small and medium sized companies directly, by creating a better 
business environment where disclosure is more robust, commercial transactions for 
all firms, including small and medium sized ones, will be improved.
22  A basic legal 
and regulatory framework that relies on disclosure and enforcement is a necessary 
foundation for all forms of primary market development, including both traditional 
public offerings and listings on the organized exchange and alternative forms of 




Minimum standards of disclosure, and the related accounting and auditing 
framework, are therefore critical to the development of a primary market.  Required 
disclosure should encompass key financial and non-financial information, including 
the identity of the ultimate beneficial owner, all material events, and all related party 
transactions as these are frequently a key source of self-dealing, tunneling and 
expropriation.  In developed markets, disclosure traditionally has centered on periodic 
disclosure, such as annual, semi-annual and quarterly reports, complemented by a 
requirement for prompt disclosure of price-sensitive information.  However, with the 
development and spread of technology, the trend is toward requiring “continuous 
disclosure,” which calls for immediate disclosure of all material information. 
 
Disclosure requirements are critical not just for securities that are offered 
publicly and traded over formal stock exchanges, but also for private offerings 
conducted outside of the formal exchange process.  Disclosure requirements help 
diminish the risk that an investor assumes in making an investment outside of the 
exchange.  As long as the disclosure is adequate, a sophisticated investor should be 
able to understand the risk involved and make its own determination as to the ratio of 
risk to reward that it can tolerate.
23   
 
Disclosure requirements are most effective when surrounded by a supportive 
infrastructure.  The legal and accounting infrastructure must be in place, investors 
need to be capable of understanding the disclosures, politicians and media need to 
support a disclosure based system and not have unrealistic expectations, controlling 
shareholders (whether government or families) must adhere to the disclosure 
principles, financial statements have to be prepared and audited in accordance with 
high quality standards, and regulators must be credible, knowledgeable and have 
                                                 
21LaPorta, et.al., 2003.  See, also, Blommestein, 2003,  in which he states that confidence in a capital 
market derives from investor assurance that the rules are “fair, equitably applied and effectively enforced;” 
that “there is adequate disclosure about the financial condition of a public company, prohibition of self-
dealing by insiders . . .and adequate arrangements for governance and representation;”  and that public 
companies and their gatekeepers adhere to strict ethical standards.   
22 Demirguc-Kunt and Beck 2004 
23 A viable enforcement regime also reduces the risk.     11
adequate enforcement powers and remedies.
 24  Obviously, this is a tall order.  For 
these reasons, the disclosure requirements must be simple and easy to enforce.  A 
legal reform strategy should carefully choose legal rules whose meaning can be 
understood and whose purpose is appreciated by domestic law makers, law enforcers, 
and economic agents who are the final consumers of these rules.
25  “The strategy for 
reform is not to create an ideal set of rules and then see how they can be enforced, but 
rather to enact the rules that can be enforced with the existing enforcement 
structure.”




To be credible and effective, therefore, disclosure requirements must be 
enforced.  “Again, it is not only the laws, but their enforcement that affects the ability 
of firms to attract external financing and, consequently, the degree of general 
financial development.”
27  Enforcement includes both ensuring there is compliance 
with disclosure requirements as well as prosecuting prohibitions against fraud and 
self-dealing.  The regulator must be sufficiently independent to investigate alleged 
violations and impose fines and other administrative sanctions where contravention of 
the rules is established.  Where civil or criminal action is taken through the courts, it 
must be timely, before judicial officers who have been trained in commercial 
proceedings and are free from bias towards government or influential commercial 
business.  It may be that commercial arbitration and less expensive and more informal 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms need to be introduced to determine disputes 
in an informed, timely and unbiased manner. 
 
However, enforcement does not need to be effected through formal litigated 
actions.  Even in the highly litigious United States, “more enforcement occurs 
through informal contacts, warnings, and administrative enforcement than through 
litigated actions.  If the SEC is skeptical of a company or its disclosures, it can 
exercise very practical, but low-visibility, sanctions, such as simply failing to clear or 
declare effective a registration statement.”
28  
 
Enforcement responsibilities do not necessarily belong solely to the regulator 
or the government.  The private sector can play a very important – and perhaps even 
more important – role.  Indeed, research has shown that private enforcement matters 
at least as much as public enforcement for the development of securities markets.  
“Securities laws matter because they reduce the costs of private contracting and 
litigation rather than provide for public regulatory enforcement.  That is, laws that 
facilitate the private enforcement of the law matter the most, especially in less 
                                                 
24 Cameron 2003. The importance of developing a qualified accounting/ auditing profession with real entry 
standards is integral to ensuring that the legal and accounting infrastructure is in place, but is beyond the 
scope of this paper.   
25 Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard 1999 
26 Lopez-de-Silanes, 2000 
27 Berglof and Claessens 2004   
28 Coffee 2002   12
developed countries.”
29  Thus, while to a certain extent, regulatory enforcement can 
compensate for weak courts, an effective judicial system also serves to complement 
and reinforce the role of regulator. 
 
In light of the ineffectiveness of enforcement in many emerging markets, 
where regulatory authority is limited, investors have few rights, legal institutions are 
weak, and the financial press is inactive if it exists at all, enhanced disclosure 
requirements may, not be sufficient to promote market development.
30  In such 
countries, a greater level of prudential oversight in the form of corporate governance 
requirements may be warranted.  While corporate governance reform alone will not 
make the market grow, its absence may in fact impede market development.  
Research has shown that companies can partly compensate for ineffective laws and 
weak enforcement by establishing good corporate governance and providing credible 
investor protection.
31  Increased corporate governance requirements provide 
confidence to minority investors.
32  Thus, while a range of measures could be 
mandated, the specific requirements appropriate in a particular market will be those 
that, in light of the particular market context, would be likely to increase investor 
confidence.    
 
In the next sections of this paper we discuss legal and regulatory mechanisms 
for improving primary market access aimed at two different targets:  one looks at 
listings on the formal organized exchange, and the other looks at alternatives to 
primary market finance outside of the formal regulated exchange.   
 
V.             Listing Fundamentals 
 
A.  Why Companies Do and Do Not List 
 
In considering what can be done from a legal and regulatory perspective to 
encourage companies to list on a regulated securities exchange in an emerging market 
economy, it is instructive to examine what motivates companies to list in addition to 
identifying specific disincentives that may exist.  Potential public offerings may be 
drawn from companies that are controlled by government, the founder of the 
business, or the family of the founder.  
 
 There are a number of reasons that a government may choose to privatize a 
state owned enterprise through making a public offering.  These include raising funds 
to reduce government debt, pursuing a government policy of relinquishing public 
                                                 
29 Lopez-de-Silanes 2004  “The development of capital markets depends crucially on laws that facilitate 
enforcement and the improvement of court procedures that allow for a more efficient dispute resolution.” 
30 Lopez-de-Silanes 2000 
31 Klapper and Love 2002.  John Coffee argues, in fact, that a desire to “bond” to higher standards of 
disclosure and corporate governance is a key reason why issuers from emerging markets seek to list their 
shares on global markets.  “By opting instead for a higher disclosure regime, the migrating firms maximize 
their share price and become able to raise additional equity at lower cost.”  Coffee argues there’s a bonding 
effect attracting the prime issuers, not just a search for liquidity and market segmentation.  Coffee, 2002 
32 F. Lopez-de-Silanes, 2000   13
ownership of key assets, and, particularly where the government is to continue to hold 
a significant stake in the company through staged privatization, opening the company 
to management expertise outside the public sector in order to create greater 
efficiencies and increase profitability.
33  Through listing on the exchange, a privatized 
state owned enterprise is exposed to greater competition and public scrutiny and can 
also boost private sector development by providing smaller exchanges with quality 
blue chip shares for secondary trading, thereby increasing total market capitalization 
of the exchange, and furnishing pension funds, collective investment schemes and 
individual investors with a broader array of investment choices. 
 
Companies in the private sector pursue a rather different set of objectives 
when they decide to enter the capital market.  They are seeking to raise equity for 
business expansion through initiating new ventures, making acquisitions or upgrading 
equipment.  They may be looking to reduce the costs of outside finance and retire 
existing debt by raising funds at a lower cost or on more competitive terms, or to tap 
an alternative source of funds rather than continuing to rely on retained earnings, 
bank borrowings or increased equity contributions from family and friends.  
Alternatively, a company may need to attract long term financing which is not 
available to it through the banking sector, or wish to create an exit mechanism for 
existing shareholders (such as private equity investors or disenchanted family 
members), or to enhance the company’s reputation and thereby seek to gain a 
competitive advantage by signaling that they are of sufficient size and quality to list 
or to attract higher quality managers.
34 
 
Disincentives to listing faced by state owned enterprises in emerging markets 
include inadequate secondary market mechanisms (including transparency and 
liquidity) as described above, political opposition to privatization of ownership of 
certain strategic assets, a private sector that is not sufficiently mature to be able to 
absorb a large public offering of securities, lack of profitability or a perceived 
inability to generate sufficient profits to make the company attractive to potential 
investors, and poor governance practices (for example poor quality management, 




The high cost of external finance, high costs of making an initial public 
offering (underwriting fees, accounting and legal fees, brokerage charges, printing 
and advertising costs, and listing fees) and the expense of meeting ongoing 
governance requirements for public companies (financial and significant event 
disclosures, internal financial controls, composition and functioning of the board) can 
                                                 
33 Partial privatization of a state-owned company, while increasing market capitalization, may not 
contribute to economic efficiency and may even lead to undesirable practices, such as regulatory 
forbearance.  Privatization through sale to a multinational strategic investor may, however, lead to complete 
integration of the privatized company into the foreign investor, and the loss of the potential local listing.   
34 There is a great deal of academic literature on why firms go public.  See, e.g., I. Welch and J. Ritter, 
2002.  See, also, literature review in J. Ritter, 2005. 
35 See discussion in forthcoming World Bank paper by Yongboem Kim: The Links between Privatisation 
and Stock Market Development in the People’s Republic of China   14
provide strong disincentives for a private sector company to list.  Costs and expenses 
of this nature can be prohibitive for smaller enterprises relative to their size.  Other 
obstacles include lack of understanding by entrepreneurs of the availability of the 
primary market for accessing finance, the potential for the founder to lose absolute 
control over the company and concerns over greater transparency. 
 
In many emerging markets, the corporate sector is dominated by companies 
with a strong controlling shareholder.  Many companies, when they are not controlled  
by the State itself, are controlled by individuals or families who frequently are also 
the company’s founder.  “For developing countries, the average firm is majority 
controlled. .  .  .  Large family owners are the norm not only in East Asia, but around 
the world.”
36  Controlling shareholders typically simply do not want to relinquish 
control of the companies that they dominate.  In Mexico, for example, medium-sized 
companies “tend to remain under the control of their founding families, who fund 
themselves with credit and do not have incentives to take them public.”
37  Research 
on family-controlled companies has demonstrated that frequently such companies are 
better managed and demonstrate higher performance than companies with a more 
dispersed ownership base.
38  In emerging markets in particular, families can exert a 
meaningful control on management that might otherwise be lacking, particularly 
where an effective court system and a strong regulator may be absent
39  A controlling 
shareholder is in a good position to run the company as it sees fit, and may well be 
able to raise necessary funds through pre-existing personal or political relationships.  
While this type of financing may inhibit the long term growth prospects of the 
company, in the short and medium terms, it may be sufficient.    
 
The desire of many family-owned companies to remain as private companies 
and their reluctance to grow beyond reinvesting retained earnings and financing by 
family and friends can stem from many causes, including the concern over loss of 
control described above.  In addition, the need for full disclosure of the company’s 
financial position and to publish audited financial statements that accord with 
international standards can give rise to a higher tax burden and have a significant 
adverse impact on the company’s profitability, and is thus a significant disincentive to 
obtaining a listing.
40 Sometimes the founder does not want to assume the regulatory 
burden and costs of increased disclosure, particularly as these are not simply a one-
                                                 
36 T. Nenova, 2004  By way of example, in Brazil, almost 51 percent of all firms are controlled by 
individuals, and in Mexico, the ten largest shareholders in the 40 largest companies own more than 80% of 
their respective company’s shares, and almost 70% of the shares of the 60 most actively traded companies 
are held by controlling shareholders. 
37 Financial Times, April 12, 2005 
38 Andersen 2004 
39 T. Nenova, 2004 
40 In countries as diverse as India, Colombia and Kenya, endeavors have been made to overcome 
companies’ reluctance to make full financial disclosure by offering fiscal incentives to companies that list.  
Measures include lower income tax rates and exemptions from capital gains taxes on transfers of shares on 
exchange but rarely provide a moratorium on taxes properly payable in past years.   While in the short term 
they can be effective in encouraging listing, tax incentives often have undesirable side effects, including 
distorting the country’s tax revenue base and being readily open to abuse.   15
time expense but an ongoing cost of doing business as a public company.
41  
Sometimes there is simply a cultural reluctance to disclose information that may 
appear to be personal in nature.
42  In some markets, it may in fact be dangerous – 
personally dangerous – to disclose information about yourself and your company.  Of 
course, none of these reasons is necessarily exclusive and there may be considerable 
overlap. 
43    
 
Many impediments to listing can be mitigated or removed altogether through 
education and training initiatives and by legal and regulatory reform.  But alleviation 
of perceived obstacles is not of itself capable of bringing public or private sector 
companies to list on the exchange because the obstacles, while serious, are in fact 
incidental to the key incentives motivating companies to list.  Recent experience in 
Korea provides evidence of this. 
 
  In 2005, the Korean government conducted a survey on costs incurred by 
public companies, with a view to investigating causes of sluggish activity in the stock 
market.
44  The survey found that 40 percent of listed companies do not see great 
advantages in being public.  For example, 19.1 percent of listed companies consider 
that the costs are higher than the benefits of remaining public, and 20.9 percent see no 
net benefits.  
 
Most listed companies in Korea also raised serious concerns over ever-
increasing compliance costs.  More specifically, they indicated that the most 
burdensome regulations are:  (i) disclosure rules (60 percent), (ii) litigation risks (50 
percent), and (iii) requirements for listing maintenance (42 percent).  The total 
compliance costs in Korea are estimated to be far lower than those in the US; 
however, the relative amount to the market capitalization and GDP is comparable.  As 
expected, since the compliance costs are a fixed cost, smaller companies tend to be 
affected more negatively as the regulatory burdens increase.
45  
 
                                                 
41 One way to overcome the disincentive to list caused by the increased disclosure and governance 
requirements is to impose those requirements on all companies – not just listed companies – above a certain 
size, and a number of countries, including, for example, Sri Lanka and Tunisia, have done so.  However, it 
is important to ensure that such requirements are then enforced. 
42 The different approaches taken by developed markets to requiring disclosure of executive compensation 
amply demonstrates these divergent cultural sensitivities.   
43 A reluctance to disclose is not unique to emerging markets.  In the United States, for example, when the 
SEC proposed to increase disclosure for companies traded on Nasdaq’s over-the-counter Bulletin Board, a 
significant number of companies delisted, rather than take on the new disclosure burden.  Bushee and Leuz, 
2004 
44 The Korea Securities Research Institute, “Policy Recommendations for Reducing Compliance Costs of 
Public Companies,” June 2005. The data for listed companies were collected from 201 companies (113 in 
KSE and 88 in KOSDAQ) out of 1,566. In addition, focused interviews with senior mangers from 20 
companies in each market were carried out to complement the survey and to estimate the absolute amount 
of compliance costs. 
45 To a certain extent at least, this is expected:  those companies that do not list are most likely to complain 
about the burdens, and some of those companies might in fact not be able to list should they desire to do so.   16
The survey also investigated private companies.  The reasons for remaining 
private are similar to the cost concerns articulated by public companies. They include:  
(i) risks of interference in the management by new shareholders (42 percent), (ii) 
burdens of meeting requirements for listing, both initially and on an ongoing basis  
(34 percent), and (iii) contingent costs from unexpected litigation (20 percent).  
 
The survey results clearly show the challenges that governments in emerging 
markets can face in undertaking capital market reforms. The reform measures 
bringing new and strengthened regulations, such as enhanced disclosure and tighter 
listing requirements, are perceived as burdening firms with increased costs, while 
their benefits are estimated to be less significant and less immediate in impact.  
 
B.  Listing Standards and Disclosure Rules 
 
Regulators and exchanges may alter exchange listing standards or public 
offering disclosure requirements in an effort to attract listings to the domestic 
organized exchange.  Eligibility standards set by exchanges for companies to list 
initially and to maintain their listing generally set minimum requirements for a 
company to qualify for listing on the exchange (such as its record of profitability, 
number of shares and shareholders, market capitalization, free float, shareholder 
voting rights), and establish ongoing requirements the company must meet to remain 
listed (minimum market capitalization, minimum level of trading in its shares, 
number of shareholders, free float, compliance with the disclosure requirements of 
the law and the listing rules).  Regulators and exchanges can sanction companies 
which fail to comply with ongoing requirements by suspending their securities from 
trading or ultimately by delisting their securities altogether. 
 
Where a country’s laws do not provide sufficient investor protection, private 
contractual arrangements can be effective.  Exchanges can impose standards through 
listing rules, and companies can voluntarily agree with their shareholders to maintain 
higher governance standards than the law actually requires.
46  Indeed, recent research 
in Korea suggests that, even in the absence of a strong environment for legal 
enforcement, firm value can be enhanced by listing on an exchange where 
governance standards are perceived to be strict.
47   
 
Disclosure rules for public offerings require a company to disclose all 
information that is relevant to the making of an informed decision to invest in its 
securities, and extend liability for damages to directors and other persons involved in 
the issue of the prospectus in which there is a materially false or misleading statement 
or from which a material matter has been omitted.
48  Ongoing disclosures by listed 
companies generally include periodic disclosure of financial information, current 
                                                 
46 Jordan and Lubrano 2002, Klapper and Love 2002.   
47 Dewenter, C. Kim, U. Kim, W. Novaes, 2005.  This is consistent with the “bonding” effect described by 
Coffee, 2002.  See, also, the discussion about the Novo Mercado, infra. 
48 Support for a general disclosure requirement is found in the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation, 2003   17
disclosure of price sensitive information, and disclosure of information with respect 
to transactions to be entered into with related parties.  International best practice 
dictates that disclosure should in all cases be full, timely and accurate.  The 
company’s financial statements should be required to be prepared in accordance with 
internationally recognized financial reporting standards and annual financial 
statements audited in accordance with internationally recognized auditing standards. 
 
In countries where there is high ownership concentration among listed 
companies, it is desirable for directors and key executives of a company and their 
families to be required to give notice of dealings in the company’s securities and for 
substantial shareholders (generally a person and his associates who have an interest in 
5% or more of the company’s shares) to give notice of their shareholdings and any 
changes in their shareholdings.  
 
The private sector frequently plays a gatekeeper role in ensuring that listed 
companies comply with their disclosure obligations.  Accountants and auditors are 
responsible for confirming that a listed company’s financial statements are prepared 
and audited in accordance with the required standards.  Licensed market 
intermediaries underwrite new issues and provide independent valuations of company 
assets for the purpose of enabling investors to assess the pricing of an issue.  It is 
important for investors who rely on the activities of market intermediaries in 
connection with primary offers to have the protection of adequate capital 
requirements against which they can have recourse in the event of fraud or negligent 
misconduct.
49   Lawyers advise companies that are listed or to be listed on the 
contents of a prospectus for a public offering and can generally be liable for material 
inaccuracies or omissions in the prospectus unless a due diligence defense is available 
and they can bring themselves within it. 
 
Regulators and exchanges have tried to encourage public and private sector 
enterprises to access the primary equity market by reducing the time and cost to 
issuers of raising funds by public offerings through streamlining the disclosure rules 
while maintaining investor protection.  In addition, attempts have been made to 
promote greater access by establishing alternative markets with listing standards that 
are either higher or lower than those of the formal organized exchange, which, as can 
be seen below, have had mixed success.  While initiatives such as these have been 
useful, they can only go so far in promoting capital market development more 
broadly, especially in the absence of minimum rules and standards that we suggest are 
required to support a viable primary equity market in an emerging market. 
 
C.  Dealing with Delistings   
 
A necessary part of encouraging listings and promoting the market is to ensure 
that companies that are not compliant with listing standards or disclosure standards 
are delisted, and that minority shareholders are protected in that process.  The 
                                                 
49 Capital adequacy requirements for market intermediaries need to recognize the business operations and 
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regulator or the exchange is responsible for monitoring compliance with the listing 
rules and has power to suspend a company for violating the rules and ultimately to 
delist the company’s securities.  Companies are generally delisted for breaches of the 
rules that impact on the business of the exchange and have a negative effect on its 
reputation or brand rather than for corporate governance shortcomings.  A company 
may be delisted because it fails to meet ongoing minimum liquidity or market 
capitalization requirements or does not pay its annual listing fees.  It is much rarer for 
a company to be delisted because it does not file audited annual financial statements 
within the time prescribed or does not have the required number of outside directors 
or a properly constituted audit committee. 
 
A company may seek to delist on its own initiative when it ceases to have the 
required minimum number of shareholders or percentage of free float following a 
takeover, or a merger, reconstruction or amalgamation, or a share buy-back, or when 
it becomes insolvent.  A controlling shareholder may be motivated to delist the 
company because it is no longer profitable, or has squandered its growth potential, or 
is looking to reduce the costs of complying with the higher disclosure and governance 
requirements that would have to be met by it as a listed company. In the United 
States, many smaller companies have delisted voluntarily in apparent response to 
additional requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and a desire to avoid the costs of 




New capital raisings and company listings on formal exchanges provide a 
boost to the capital market but it has to be recognized that these activities involve a 
number of independent experts and advisers, are highly regulated and the costs borne 
by issuers can be considerable. Companies have other means of raising capital 
available to them, some of which may be less costly with fewer regulatory 
requirements to meet.   
 
VI.      Developing Alternatives to Listings on the Formal Organized Exchange 
 
A.  New Markets 
 
In some countries an exchange has different boards or market tiers and some 
countries support several exchanges that compete by having different listing criteria 
generally in an endeavor to facilitate access to equity capital for smaller enterprises.  
In some cases different market segments extend to over-the-counter markets where 
securities trade on an unlisted basis.  The availability of over-the-counter markets can 
also make delisting more viable because shareholders have a trading venue for 
valuing and dealing in their shares following delisting from an organized exchange. 
 
Competition between exchanges creates niche markets which meet the 
demands of different types of issuers.
51  Exchanges with high listing standards attract 
                                                 
50 Leuz, Triantis and Wang 2004 
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blue chip issuers whereas exchanges with lower standards attract lower quality 
companies.
52  By enhancing its listing rules an exchange can improve investor 
protection in the same way as cross listings do (individual companies adopt higher 
governance practices which provide greater protection to minority shareholders and 
this results in turn in greater liquidity, improved share price and lower cost of funds).  
Enhancing listing standards can also slow migration of top companies to overseas 
exchanges (e.g., the NYSE) where companies meeting the highest standards attract 
the attention of international investors. 
 
The last decade has seen an emergence of new markets, which are trying to 
duplicate the success and viability of the Nasdaq, and which cater to new and high-
growth companies. The track record of these new exchanges has been mixed, with 
some resounding failures such as the Neuer Market in Germany, and some which 
have fared better, such as the AIM in the United Kingdom and Kosdaq in South 
Korea.
53  Although these markets have pursued broadly similar strategies, there are 
distinct differences in their focus and context which have affected the outcome of 
their efforts.  One major determining factor has been timing – the failure of several 
markets occurred during the bursting of the dot-com bubble, and it is possible that 
they would have done better under different circumstances.   
 
Table 1: Summary of selected alternative markets 
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In Germany, the Deutsche Borse AG founded the Neuer Market in 1997 in an 
attempt to enable young and innovative companies to obtain equity capital
54.  In order 
to gain investors’ trust, the listing requirements in the new market were designed to 
be higher than those for the “official trading” on the Deutsche Borse.  They included 
the use of at least two designated sponsors, higher equity capital and issue market 
price requirements, quarterly reports and financial statements that complied with 
International Accounting Standards or US-GAAP to be published in German and 
English, and a six-month “lock-up” period following the IPO.  These requirements 
were put in place specifically to address the perceived caution of German investors 
with regard to investing in stock markets and the absence of an “investment culture.”  
Despite introducing higher standards, the market objective was to attract listings by 
firms which had a shorter track record and lower turnover than would be required for 
listing in the major market segments of the exchange.  
 
The Neuer Market was very successful in its first few years, leading a marked 
change in German capital markets. Where in the 14 years before the opening of the 
Neuer Market, the average IPO proceeds amounted to the equivalent of about 2.2 
Billion Euro, from 1997 on they mushroomed to reach 25.6 Billion Euro in IPO 
proceeds in 2000.  Significant “underpricing” in the Neuer Market drew more and 
more investors, not only to the primary market where issue sizes were too small to 
satisfy the growing demand, but to the secondary market as well.  Although 
institutional investors mostly stayed away from the market, the number of retail 
investors entering the market grew quickly, from 3.7 million before the Neuer Market 
began operations to 6.2 million in 2000.  During the three years and one month 
preceding March 2000, the NEMAX-All-Share index which covered the new market 
increased by about 1636%, outperforming the NASDAQ-100.  
 
However, the index started to fall in 2000, reaching an all time low in October 
2002 of about 4% of its March 2000 high.  In market capitalization terms, the market 
fell from €234 Billion in March 2000 to €29 Billion at the end of September 2002. 
Beginning in 2000, the market was beset by earnings disappointments, followed by 
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rumors of impending bankruptcies and culminating in actual insolvencies. In addition, 
there were recurring rumours of fraudulent activities by entrepreneurs of Neuer 
Market companies, which harmed the market’s reputation irrevocably.  Finally, the 
Neuer Market segment was closed and the companies that met the listing 
requirements were folded into the broader market.  
 
The reasons for the dramatic decline of the Neuer Market include a narrow 
focus on high-tech companies, the lack of sophistication of both investors and the 
relevant regulatory authorities, and timing -- the Neuer Market took off just as the 
stock market bubble was beginning to inflate around the world.  Another factor was a 
regulatory framework which, although it appeared robust, was quickly shown to be 
inadequate and unable to provide strong incentives for responsible corporate 
behavior. 
 
The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) promoted by the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) has taken a different approach than the Neuer Market, and was 
fortunate enough to have better timing.  AIM was launched in 1995 to meet the needs 
of small growing companies, and applies a less stringent regulatory regime than that 
of the “official list” of the LSE.  AIM has created a light touch regulatory 
environment that sets out to attract a broad set of companies from different sectors 
and focuses on the needs of institutional investors.  It also relies on the stronger 
investment culture and regulatory capacity that prevail in the United Kingdom. 
 
 For a company to list on AIM, there is no minimum level of shares required 
to be held by the public, no trading record requirement, no prior shareholder approval 
for transactions requirement, and no minimum market capitalization.  However, a 
company must appoint a nominated advisor (nomad) who is responsible, among other 
duties, for warranting to the LSE that the company is appropriate for AIM.  The 
company’s application for admission is pre-vetted by the nomad, not the LSE or the 
UKLA.  
 
Since AIM opened, it has admitted more than 1900 companies and raised 
more than £17 Billion. While it too experienced some difficulties at the bursting of 
the high tech bubble, the FTSE AIM index has performed well in the last few years, 
going from a level of 602 at the end of 2002 to 1046 at end of 2005.  AIM is 
considered to be the only truly effective second-tier market in Europe, and presents an 
alternative to listing on the Nasdaq for companies worldwide. This trend has 
strengthened since the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States, 
which has made it more expensive for smaller companies to list on the Nasdaq.  
Companies that list on AIM also do so because of the levels of institutional 
investment that it attracts, as compared with the United States where retail investors 
are dominant.  
 
In Brazil, the Novo Mercado was introduced by BOVESPA in December 
2000, and presents a different model altogether.  It is a listing segment for companies 
that voluntarily decide to comply with corporate governance and disclosure   22
requirements which go beyond the stipulations of Brazilian legislation.  The main 
innovation of this market is that non-voting shares may not be issued.  Since many of 
the companies currently listed on the BOVESPA either cannot (e.g., they have non 
voting shares on issue) or do not wish to comply with these requirements, the Novo 
Mercado introduced different corporate governance levels to accommodate 
companies which cannot meet the full Novo Mercado requirements.  A company can 
belong to level 1 if it maintains a 25% free float, uses public offering mechanisms 
that promote dispersion of capital and takes on additional disclosure and reporting 
duties. To receive a level 2 classification, a company must adhere to level 1 rules, and 
also adopt a broader range of corporate governance rights and minority shareholder 
rights, including annual balance sheet disclosure according to US GAAP or IFRS, tag 
along rights for common shareholders, voting rights for preferred shares in certain 
situations. Currently, 18 companies are listed on the Novo Mercado.  
 
After a quiet period, there has been an increase in the level of activity in 
the Brazilian market since mid-2004 to which the Novo Mercado appears to have 
contributed. In 2005 there were 20 new share issues, including 9 initial public 
offerings. All issuers have either been listed on the Novo Mercado or meet the higher 
corporate governance requirements of levels 1 and 2 on the exchange. The 
performance of companies listed on the Novo Mercado has also been encouraging. 
The IGC index (corporate governance index) which includes the 18 companies listed 
on the Novo Mercado together with the 47 other companies listed in levels 1 and 2 
has risen by 43.7% in 2005, well outperforming the benchmark IBOVESPA index 
which registered a 27.7% increase in the same period. 
 
In Asia, several markets have tried to emulate the Nasdaq model. Two 
important markets are KOSDAQ in Korea and the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) 
in Hong Kong, founded in 1996 and 1999 respectively.  KOSDAQ has a broad focus 
on knowledge-based ventures, high-tech companies and SMEs, and has different 
listing requirements for venture companies and  non-venture companies. The listing 
requirements are simpler than those of the Korea Stock Exchange, and the 
government of Korea has diversified requirements and relaxed regulations for listing 
on the market so that large telecommunications companies and other similar firms can 
be listed as well. The total number of companies listed on the KOSDAQ has grown 
from 331 in 1996 to 879 in 2003, and the market capitalization has grown in that time 
frame from US$6.3 Billion to US$30.8 Billion, so that within a few years the market 
has grown to represent 10% of the Korean stock exchange value (as of 2003).   
 
GEM in Hong Kong focuses more narrowly on companies with growth 
potential, and does not require a solid record of profitability for listing. GEM 
balances that by imposing more stringent listing requirements than other Asian 
second-board markets, and promotes itself as offering a “high growth, high risk” 
paradigm, appealing to professional and informed investors. GEM requires 
companies to use a “sponsor” for the first two years after listing, and has stringent 
disclosure and business practice rules that firms must adhere to.   However, GEM has 
not performed as anticipated in the years since the dot-com bubble burst. The GEM   23
index has underperformed in comparison with the Hang Seng index.  In 2004, it rose 
by 1.9% in comparison with 4.5% for the Hang Seng.  The market capitalization of 
the GEM is 0.8% of the main board, and the turnover ratio of 33% for GEM was 
lower than that of the main board at 51%.  In its peak years of 2000-2001, the number 
of listings on the GEM surpassed those on the main board; however, since 2002 that 
trend has reversed, and in 2005 ten companies listed on the GEM while 57 companies 
listed on the main board.
55 
 
Another model for promoting new and high-growth companies can be found 
in Israel. The small size of Israel’s market has led many Israeli companies to focus on 
the global market instead, and many have listed their shares on foreign exchanges.  
Israel is third only to the United States and Canada in the number of companies listed 
on the Nasdaq.  Israeli start-ups have raised more than $5.2 billion in initial public 
offerings on the Nasdaq between 2000 and 2005.  As of February 2006, 74 Israeli 
companies listed on Nasdaq had a combined market capitalization of $48.8 billion in 
comparison with the total market capitalization of the TASE of $ 122.6 billion (at end 
2005). Since January 1999, Israeli start-ups have raised more than $5.8 billion in 
IPOs and secondary offerings on foreign exchanges, 82% of which was raised on the 
Nasdaq.  
 
The Nasdaq market has been the market of choice for Israeli companies for a 
number of reasons.  The United States is the biggest equity market in the world, with 
a market capitalization and trading value far exceeding other prominent markets such 
as London and Tokyo.  Such a large market attracts companies globally.  Also, being 
a small country, with a small domestic market, many Israeli companies see their 
market globally, and therefore look to access their financing in a global environment 
as well, in a way that promotes their global visibility. 
 
At least 15 Israeli companies have listed on the AIM market in the last couple 
of years, and a steady stream of additional companies is expected to follow.  In 
addition, there are nine Israeli companies listed on the LSE, three on the NYSE and 
one on AMEX.  Smaller companies are finding the legal and accounting costs 
associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to be prohibitive relative to their current size.  
The AIM market targets smaller companies than the Nasdaq, and is less costly.  
Nasdaq estimates that the average market capitalization of Israeli companies listed on 
the Nasdaq is $670 million, as compared to $373.7 million on the LSE and $47.5 
million on AIM.   
 
From the Israeli market’s perspective, as of August 2005, there were 41 
companies dual-listed on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange and on US exchanges, 
primarily the Nasdaq.  The Israeli Parliament has recently approved an expansion of 
dual-listing on the TASE to London Stock Exchange Official List companies and 
NASDAQ SmallCap listed companies.  In further trying to attract companies to dual-
list, Israel has exempted local investors from capital gains tax on their investments in 
TASE dual listed shares.  The dual listing has expanded the universe of investment 
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opportunities available to Israeli investors, contributed to increased activity on the 
domestic market and raised the profile of the Israeli securities industry.  
 
Israeli companies have listed abroad in order to take advantage of the larger 
pools of funds available outside the country, and lower cost of capital associated with 
highly liquid and efficient markets such as the Nasdaq.  The Tel-Aviv Stock 
Exchange’s performance has not suffered from this migration, and with many 
companies now dual-listing in Israel, the Israeli capital markets are gaining.  Further, 
Israeli companies listed on the Nasdaq and elsewhere are important players in the 
Israeli economy, and their ability to grow by accessing foreign markets enables them 
to invest more in Israel, and create jobs and pay taxes there.  However, this model is 
not without its risks.  Israeli companies listing abroad are “small fish”, without much 
influence on lawmakers outside the country, and therefore are vulnerable to changes 
in the regulatory environment (such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) which could have a 
negative impact on the allure of new listings and the costs to issuers of remaining 
listed on exchanges outside Israel.  
 
While many emerging market economies have difficulty supporting one 
formal exchange with only one segment, the experience of different alternative 
market models for the financing of new and high-growth companies highlight the 
many different elements which have contributed to their success or failure and which 
can be useful considerations in thinking about promoting access to finance in 
emerging markets.  A few general observations can be made: markets which narrowly 
focus on one sector are vulnerable to a downturn in that sector; active enforcement 
backed by a strong regulatory environment and regulatory capacity is crucial;  a 
market which targets unsophisticated investors needs to be subject to more stringent 
regulation; a supervisory and advisory role, similar to the one played by “nomads” on 
the AIM market can be a helpful tool in keeping inexperienced companies on the 
right track; finally, under certain circumstances, the lack of a deep domestic market 
does not necessarily mean that smaller and new companies cannot successfully access 
financing on a primary market elsewhere.  
 
 
B.  Private Placements 
 
Formal exchange offerings, whether on the primary stock exchange or on a 
second board or segment, are not, however, the only way companies raise funds, and, 
in fact, most companies do not rely on exchange financing or even on offerings to the 
public.  In all countries, developed and emerging, the owners of most companies raise 
funds from their families, friends and trading partners, and then use their own equity 
for further financing.  In recognition of this pattern, some developed markets have 
built a legal mechanism that permits companies to go beyond their limited circle in 
seeking funding, but does not entail the time or expense of making a public offering.  
This mechanism, the so-called private placement, can be very useful for encouraging 
growth and for addressing the incentives, preferences and market structure issues that 
are characteristic of primary market growth in many emerging markets.  The US   25
experience for example, “has clearly demonstrated both that the private placement 
markets can be successfully promoted as a valuable source of capital, complementary 
to the public markets, as well as that these markets can only properly develop in an 
environment of clear regulatory “safe harbors,” under which both issuers and 
investors can operate with confidence.”
56   
 
A private placement is a technique in which an issuer offers its securities to a 
restricted audience in exchange for funds.  Because the offering is restricted in scope, 
it does not require the regulatory oversight necessary for investor protection in a 
public offering.  It is therefore less timely and costly, and is well-suited for the needs 
of less established or lesser known companies with smaller capital requirements and 
limited resources.  Similar to the market for bank loans, the terms of a private 
placement are typically negotiated between the issuer and the investors, who use 
contractual covenants to control their risk.  However, maturities in a private 
placement tend to be longer than in a bank loan, and upon a possible default, it is 
easier and more typical for the parties to renegotiate the terms.   
 
Historically, private markets emerged before public markets in developed 
economies.  Indeed, a private placement market can serve as a filter for the public 
market.  A private placement market allows riskier and newer companies to find 
financing outside of the public market which may have a base of inexperienced retail 
investors and is therefore better adapted to products with a safer profile.  Private 
placements are well suited for companies seeking to bridge the financing gap between 
family and friends on the one hand, and the public markets on the other.  It has been 
argued in fact that, in emerging markets there is “a pressing need for some form of 
registration exemption [or] modified process applicable to SMEs to enable them to 
raise capital in a quicker and less costly manner than the full registration process.”
57   
 
Minimal legal and regulatory requirements apply to private placements.  The 
principal requirement is that a legal or regulatory exemption from full securities 
registration be created.  The rationale for this exemption is that the offering is being 
made to a limited audience and, therefore, the protections of the full panoply of 
securities laws are not necessary.  The scope of that exemption, however, can vary, 
depending on the composition of the country’s market.  For example, an exemption 
may be created for offerings to a limited number of investors, or to investors who are 
deemed to be “sophisticated” and able to look out for themselves without the 
protection of the securities laws.  These “sophisticated” investors are typically 
denoted as individuals with high net worth or as institutional investors of a certain 
type or size.  Alternatively, an exemption may be created based on the size of the 
offering.
58  What is key, though, is that the exemption be clear, certain, and complete.  
A clear legal and regulatory foundation is necessary to inspire confidence and attract 
issuers and investors.  Absent certainty, the market will be confused and will not take 
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advantage of the exemption.  Without completeness, the exemption will not be 
sufficiently distinct from a public offering to accomplish the goal of bringing new 
issuers who may have difficulty with the hurdles of a public offering into the market.  
 
In some countries, private placements are regulated to such an extent that they 
cannot easily be distinguished from a public offering.  “… the greater the technical 
requirements, the more the conditions begin to look like a registered offering, the less 
the exemption will be utilized and SMEs will remain frozen out of the capital 
market.”
59  In India, for example, private placements can be listed and traded if the 
issuer has an investment grade rating.  In that case, however, the full regulations 
applicable to listed companies apply and the benefits of a “private” vehicle may be 
lost.  In France, private placements have been permitted only since 1998.  The legal 
framework in which they are offered remains confusing, as laws on solicitation 
(“demarchage”) remain highly restrictive and geared to an exclusively public offering 
regime.
60  Private placements in Africa are rare, where many countries lack a legal 
process that would allow companies to undertake limited public offerings without full 
registration.
61    
 
An offering that qualifies for exemption from registration should be exempt 
from regulatory review and oversight.  This is a significant factor in reducing the time 
and cost entailed in raising funds beyond family and friends.  Fundamental anti-fraud 
requirements should apply, which require the issuer and controlling shareholder/ 
founder not to misrepresent or make any key omissions about the offering, and 
investors should be legally able to protect themselves by bringing an action for fraud 
against the issuer, the controlling shareholders, and the directors.  While other 
requirements could be added, such as, for example, requirements that the issuer sell a 
minimum amount of securities within a fixed time period for the offering to be 
effective, the more requirements that are added, the less simple and attractive the 
mechanism.   
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Private placements can be attractive to both issuers and investors.  For issuers, 
as noted above, private placements have the advantage of relative speed and low costs 
as compared to a public offering.  An issuer can reduce its dependence on bank 
financing, while engaging in a confidential transaction.  Thus, to the extent that 
controlling shareholders/ founders are reluctant to submit to public disclosure 
obligations, a private placement can offer a relatively stable, long-term source of 
funds that does not require public disclosure or a loss of control.  They also provide 
the issuer with an opportunity to build its reputation, and thus position it to enter the 
public markets in the future.  For an investor, a private placement provides an 
attractive alternative investment opportunity, particularly where public equity markets 
are limited.  From the investor’s perspective, the private placement vehicle gives 
greater control over the investment and a better ability to assess risks.  These are 
features that may well be lacking for an investor in a typical public emerging market.  
The attractiveness of the private placement can be enhanced if there is a regulated 
OTC market on which the private placement shares can be traded after an initial 
“restricted” period.  In the United States, for example, the attractiveness of private 
placements was increased when the SEC created Rule 144A, a form of private 
placement to qualified institutional investors in which shares could subsequently be 
traded among other Rule 144A qualified institutional investors.
62   
 
C. Other  Alternatives 
 
Private placements are not the only alternative for firms seeking primary 
financing outside the public markets.  Other alternatives include corporate debt 
offerings and securitization.  Two other alternatives that deserve brief mention are 
special instruments and venture capital.   
 
1.  Special Instruments.  It is possible to create a specialized vehicle tailored to 
the particular dimensions of the financial sector with the goal of promoting 
investment through the primary market, thereby both increasing access to finance for 
issuers and greater opportunities for investors.  In many emerging markets, the 
securities market is hampered by both demand and supply side problems.  On the 
demand side, the institutional investor base either is limited, or faces significant 
restrictions in the types of products in which it is permitted to invest.  On the supply 
side, there is frequently a limited source of investments.  Only a few companies are 
listed on the domestic market, and unlisted companies may pose unacceptable risks.  
A specialized or “mezzanine” vehicle, which is aimed at bridging the gap between 
unlisted SMEs and listed companies, and in which institutional investors are 
permitted to invest, could serve to break the logjam.   
 
In Mexico, for example, the Mexican legislature has recently adopted a new 
securities law that allows for the creation of a special investment vehicle, a “sapi” or 
investment promotion group,” that would give special protections to minority 
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shareholders.
63  This new vehicle would also be subject to fewer reporting 
requirements than public companies.  Even though sapis would be permitted to list on 
the market, they would have a three year “grace period” until they are required to 
make full disclosure of their accounts.  Because of the risks involved and the limited 
disclosure, investment in this new vehicle would be restricted either to institutional 
investors, or to private investors who have signed a waiver acknowledging that they 
understand the risks of the investment.  Pension funds, however, which previously 
have been limited to investing in bonds, would be permitted to invest in the new 
vehicle. This new vehicle is expected to increase venture capital investment by 
creating an exit mechanism, build liquidity through increased pension fund 
investment, encourage listings, and protect minority shareholder rights.
64   
 
 
2. Private Equity.  Another potential source of capital for issuers in emerging 
markets is private equity, or venture capital investment funds.  However, private 
equity should not be considered as an antidote to regulated markets.  Arguments that 
private equity would take off if “stifling” regulation were eliminated are specious.  
Indeed, “[i]f developing a strong public stock market is hard, developing a strong 
venture capital industry is harder still.”
65  Development of a private equity industry is 
a bit of a chicken and egg problem.  On the one hand, venture capitalists are unlikely 
to supply funding to a firm without an established reputation; on the other, it is 
difficult for a firm to gain much of a reputation without funding.  Regulation is 
necessary to bridge the gap between the venture capitalist seeking a profitable 
investment with limited risk, and the issuer seeking the private equity funding.  
Without at least limited regulation, the venture capitalist is likely to feel that he is 
taking on more risk than he is willing to bargain for – literally.  In addition to the risk 
of the venture itself, he may be assuming the risks inherent in a weak regulatory 
system with limited property rights, disclosure and judicial enforcement and limited 
avenues for redress and exit.  Indeed, private equity investments in small and high-
tech firms are more likely in countries with stronger guarantees against contract 
repudiation and shareholder rights.
66  In countries where legal enforcement is poor, 
investors are likely to seek majority control of the firms they invest in to counteract 
their apparent inability to enforce contractual rights.
67   
 
In addition to limited regulation that will promote private equity investment 
by closing the gap between risk and potential reward, ensuring that there is an exit 
mechanism is a key element in creating a venture capital industry.  Private equity 
investments typically do not pay dividends; rather, returns are derived from capital 
gains obtained upon exit.  While a private sale to another company can be an 
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attractive and effective exit for equity investors, the more typical bait is the potential 
for an initial public offering (IPO).  Private equity will not thrive in the absence of a 
“well-developed stock market that permits venture capitalists to exit through an initial 
public offering.”
68  Indeed, a venture capital industry and stock market development 
are positively correlated.  “. . . IPOs are the strongest driver of venture capital 
investing, whereas GDP and market capitalization growth are not significant.”
69  
Thus, the establishment of the Neuer Markt in Germany, described above, also had a 
positive impact on the venture capital industry in Germany because it created a 
potential exit mechanism.
70  The Mexican Sapi vehicle, described above, also seeks to 
bring together private equity with a potential exit mechanism.   
 
In addition to serving as an exit opportunity, a stock exchange also promotes 
private equity because the infrastructure and the investment culture that tends to 
accompany an exchange are also important for private equity.  For example, in bank-
centered systems without a strong stock market, there is likely to be more of a 
conservative approach to lending and investing, the incentives that reward 
entrepreneurial behavior may be weaker and the penalties for failure stronger, and 
experienced private investors able to assess and contribute to a new venture may be 
limited.
71 
The experience in Israel shows that the government can play an important role 
in promoting the emergence of a venture capital industry. In the early 1990’s, in an 
attempt to capitalize on the skills of Russian immigrants arriving after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, many of whom held academic degrees, the government of Israel 
allocated $100 million to promote the new Yozma (Hebrew for ‘initiative’) program.  
Yozma was a fund of funds under which 10 venture capital funds were formed in 
partnership with leading foreign venture investors, who held a 60% share. A major 
attraction of the Yozma program was the foreign investors' option to buy out the 
government's share at a pre-agreed price for a period of 5 years.  
Ten venture capital funds were formed with a total of $210 million under 
management, and 15 direct investments were made by Yozma itself.  Nine out of the 
15 direct investments enjoyed successful exits, either through IPOs or through 
acquisition, and nine of the ten foreign funds exercised their option and bought out 
the government's share.  This helped lay the groundwork for an independent local 
venture capital industry comprising close to 80 venture capital funds, with total 
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VI.     Conclusion 
 
A simple legal and regulatory framework has many benefits that will help 
promote market development.  Indeed, “stronger laws and regulatory institutions that 
protect investors (whether domestic or foreign) from colluding insiders are strongly 
correlated with deeper and more robust equity markets.”
73  A framework that 
emphasizes disclosure and enforcement, that facilitates listing for companies who are 
ready for a public commitment, that provides a legal mechanism for small companies 
to obtain financing outside the organized exchange, and that provides incentives for 
companies to develop good corporate governance practices including, most 
particularly, duties of care and loyalty to all shareholders, can begin to overcome the 
obstacles to development.  This kind of simple regulatory framework, by facilitating 
entry and exit for companies and ensuring the protection of property rights for 
investors and issuers, is conducive to economic growth.  Creating a positive business 
environment makes it more likely that all firms, both large and small, will be willing 
to participate in the market and therefore contribute to its overall growth.
74  
 
There is much evidence to indicate that these kinds of micro-structural 
improvements can have a positive impact on market development.  In addition to 
creating opportunities for domestic market development, the quality of 
“housekeeping” and efficiency of “plumbing” in an emerging market have a positive 
influence on decisions by foreign portfolio investors to invest in the market.
75   These 
kind of improvements also will further the potential for possible regionalization, 
which may be significant in many of the smaller markets. 
 
Although the need to recognize the stage of a country’s capital market 
development and the legal system that applies in the jurisdiction means that there is 
not one model of reform and the way in which reforms are implemented will vary 
depending on what works, it is possible to identify the basic necessities that need to 
be tackled to facilitate further development of the market in every developing 
country, regardless of its individual circumstances.   These basic necessities apply to 
and will support all forms of primary market finance. 
 
1.  Create a supportive environment. 
  Put fiscal practices on solid ground.  Unstable macroeconomic conditions 
make it hard to predict behavior.   
  Ensure that there are basic protections of property rights, and that data 
registries exist.  These are the necessary foundations for disclosure and 
enforcement and to promote market confidence. 
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  Encourage the growth of savings and invest in investor education and 
issuer training.  These are necessary to build an equity culture. 
 
2. Establish elements of basic market structure. 
  Impose capital requirements on market intermediaries to provide a safety 
cushion that can reduce the risk of going to market for both issuers and 
investors. 
  Ensure order handling and trading rules result in best execution of orders 
and transparency of dealings 
  Clearance and settlement procedures for stock exchange transactions 
should at a minimum require settlement on the basis of delivery versus 
payment on the 3
rd day after orders have been executed 
  Valuation mechanisms should address the deficiencies that arise when 
markets are illiquid 
  Collective investment schemes can allow the pooling of savings of retail 
investors. 
 
3.  Impose fundamental disclosure requirements appropriate for the type of 
offering. 
  Any company making an offer of shares should be required to disclose 
fully and fairly without omissions or misleading statements.   
  High quality accounting and auditing standards must be imposed, and 
enforced. 
  Impose more substantial disclosure requirements, such as continuous 
disclosure requirements, on those issuers making offerings on the formal 
exchange.  Disclosure must be timely, and it should be reviewed and 
requirements enforced. 
  Create a legal mechanism for a private offering that takes place off of the 
exchange and that will not be subject to review by the securities regulator.  
This can be a private placement or alternative form of financing.  (This of 
course does not apply to exchange listings.) 
 
4.  Consider mandating specific corporate governance requirements. 
  The accountability of the board of directors of the company to the entire 
company and its shareholders is key, and a range of different measures can 
be used to achieve this, depending on the market and the legal and 
regulatory context.  For example, requirements for independent directors, 
for audit committees, lock-in provisions for majority shareholders, and 
providing voting rights to all shareholders are all specific measures that 
can be used to enhance the accountability of the board of directors. 
 
5.  Take enforcement seriously. 
  These requirements should be able to be enforced either by the securities 
regulator or by an investor, or both. 
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In addition to the basic legal and regulatory necessities identified above, there 
also needs to be a general awareness on the part of potential issuers and investors of 
the benefits of financial markets and a pool of skilled market intermediaries, policy 
makers, company directors, accountants, lawyers and financial analysts who have a 
deep understanding of the operations of the market to be able to contribute to capital 
market development.  Education and training thus have an essential part to play in 
raising awareness in the community of the role of the capital market as a source of 
funding and investment and equipping market players with the skills they need for the 
market to operate effectively.  With education and training, and the basic legal and 
regulatory infrastructure in place, a capital market will be better positioned to 
experience the growth and development necessary for it to serve as a source of 
financing for small-and-medium size companies and contribute to the health of the 
country’s economy.     33
 
APPENDIX 1: Statistics for Selected Alternative Markets 
 
Source: FIBV, World Bank (for GDP figures) 
 
Market Capitalization, % of GDP 
Exchange  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Neuer Market (Germany)  NA  2.2% 3.5% 4.3% 2.4% 0.5%  NA  NA 
AIM (UK)  0.7% 0.5% 1.5% 1.6% 1.2% 1.1% 1.8% 2.8%
GEM (Hong Kong)  NA  NA  0.6% 5.2% 4.8% 4.2% 5.8% 5.3%
Kosdaq (S. Korea)  NA  NA  NA  4.5% 8.2% 5.6% 5.1% 4.4%
 
 
Market capitalization, USD Millions 
Exchange  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Neuer Market (Germany)  NA  46636 74571 80868 44460 10341  NA  NA 
AIM  (UK)  9304 7383 21705 22311 16893 16432 32865 60958
GEM  (Hong  Kong)  NA  NA  931 8627 7818 6695 9039 8583
Kosdaq (S. Korea)  NA  NA  NA  22937 39450  30848  31209 30048
 
 
New capital raised, USD Millions 
Exchange  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Neuer Market (Germany)  NA NA  7090 11665 438  0  NA  NA 
AIM  (UK)  1137 925 1506 4646 1626 1395 3435 8480
GEM (Hong Kong)  NA  NA  NA  2060 748  1166  596 678
Kosdaq (S. Korea)  NA  NA  NA  6402 2065  1079  2121 1632
 
 
Capital raised, % of market capitalization 
Exchange  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Neuer Market (Germany)  NA NA  10% 14% 1%  0%  NA  NA 
AIM (UK)  12% 13% 7% 21% 10%  8%  10% 14%
GEM (Hong Kong)  NA  NA NA  24% 10%  17% 7% 8%
Kosdaq (S. Korea)  NA  NA  NA  28% 5%  3%  7% 5%
 
 
Number of companies with shares traded 
Exchange  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Neuer Market (Germany)  NA NA  201 339 326  240  NA  NA 
AIM  (UK)  308 312 347 524 629 704 754 1021
GEM  (Hong  Kong)  NA  NA  7 54 111 166 185 204








Exchange  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Neuer Market (Germany)  NA NA  184% 379% 198% 326%  NA  NA 
AIM  (UK)  21% 22% 20% 46% 21% 16% 17% 27%
GEM (Hong Kong)  NA  NA  NA  125% 65% 84% 54% 39%
Kosdaq (S. Korea)  NA  NA  NA  1994% 821%  796%  716% 501%
*Annual trading value/end-year market capitalization 
 
 
Value of share trading, USD Millions 
Exchange  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Neuer Market 
(Germany)  NA NA  136970 306732 88082  33681  NA NA 
AIM  (UK)  1977 1604 4356 10282 3500 2648 5434 16636
GEM  (Hong  Kong) NA NA NA  10815 5053  5638  4901 3307
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